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:: Volume 1, Issue 3 (winter 2005) ::
Andishe-Novin-E-Dini 2005, 1(3): 141-157 Back to browse issues page
A Critical Study of the Theory of the Subjectivity of Moral Values With Reference to Mackay's Theory
Abstract:   (368 Views)
According to mackay, values in general and ethical values in particular are subjective in nature. That is, they have no foundation independent of mans wishes and subjective human inelinations.  According to his definition of subjectivism, values have no foundation, but the basis of values are not independent of man's desires. He offers two arguments for his theory. One is based on the relativity and ethical differences and the other one is based on strangeness. Each of these orguments were criticized by the objectivist philosophers of ethies and some of objectivist anthropologists.
Key words: mackay, subjectivity of moral values, elativity, strangeness, objectivism.
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Type of Study: Applicable | Subject: Special
Received: 2020/12/20 | Accepted: 2005/12/1 | Published: 2005/12/1 | ePublished: 2005/12/1
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A Critical Study of the Theory of the Subjectivity of Moral Values With Reference to Mackay's Theory. Andishe-Novin-E-Dini. 2005; 1 (3) :141-157
URL: http://andishe.maaref.ac.ir/article-1-1777-en.html

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Volume 1, Issue 3 (winter 2005) Back to browse issues page
فصلنامه علمی اندیشه نوین دینی A Research Quarterly in Islamic Theology (kalam) and Religious Studies
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